The EU courts have been criticized by competition law scholars for exercising insufficient
1. Introduction 1.1. The right to judicial review of administrative agency actions is internationally recognized guarantee of due process and procedural fairness. As Louis L. Jaffe wrote "the availability of judicial review is a necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid".
1 Right to judicial review is based on the presumption that every individual should have a right to ask an independent and impartial tribunal established by law to review the administrative decision that concerns his interests. Judicial review increases legality of the administrative process (its accordance with lawmaker commends), promotes efficient resource allocation, contributes to the protection of values recognized in the society and protects against arbitrariness and deferential standard of review regard the administrative agencies greater than courts political accountability for the decision taken. 11 It is also argued that administrative agencies are more likely to response quickly to changing circumstances 12 as well that they guarantee greater uniformity of the decisions across the nation.
13
Counterarguments against the deferential standard review (more reflected in the administrative law systems of European civil law countries than common law one such as Canada or U.S.) are instead focused on the constitutional role of courts to control the abuse of powers by the administrative agencies and so protection against arbitrariness and selectivity.
14 The courts are also seen to play the primary role in the interpretation of statutory provisions 15 and have been traditionally perceived to be entrusted in duty to eventually say what the law is. 16 In the European context where courts are perceived as the guardians of proper substantive law interpretation and respect for procedural fairness by the administrative authorities the arguments for deference seem to be stronger in factual (especially these that require expertise)
rather than legal matters. 17 Importantly, there is no counterpart of U.S. Chevron deference doctrine in the EU law: the EU Courts cannot be expected to defer to administrative authority's reasonable interpretation of statutory provision that was left by legislator ambiguous. It is undisputed that in the light of Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) the CJEU bears primary responsibility for the interpretation of the EU Treaties. Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence based on Article 6 of the ECHR to the EU competition 11 Evan J. Criddle, Chevron Consensus, 88 Boston University Law Review 1271, 1288-1290 (2008) . 12 To put it in Peter H. Schuck's words about administrative agency discretion judicial deference to its decisions may vitalize agencies by "infusing them with energy direction, mobility, and the capacity for change", Peter H. Schuck, Foundations of Administrative Law, 175 (2004) . 13 Evan J. Criddle, supra note 11, at 1291. 14 Peter H. Schuck, supra note 12, at 175 notices dark side of administrative agency discretion: "(d)iscretion enables and even invites officials to overreach, to discriminate invidiously, to subordinate public interests to private ones, to conceal bureaucratic reasons and purposes, and to tyrannize over the citizenry in countless large and small ways". Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 525 posits that judicial review is considered to play a role in "ensurance of legality, protection against arbitrariness and selectivity, promotion of procedural regularity, and ensurance against the twin evils of factional tyranny and self-interested representation". 15 Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 551 (1985) . 16 Antonin Scalia, supra note 7, at 514. It is pointed that the courts' traditional understanding of judicial role may overwhelm doctrinal initiatives to place some part of this responsibility in other hands, (2006) . 18 Article 19(1) of the TEU provides that the CJEU "shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed". Additionally Article 267 of the TFEU provides that the CJEU has a jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the Treaties as well as the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union.
proceedings. Article 6 of the ECHR is considered as a source of binding standard for the EU competition proceedings. This is the consequence of the fact that Article 6(3) of the Treaty establishing the European Union provides that the "fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law." Article 6 of the ECHR is also reflected in Article 47 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights 19 (the CFR) that regulates at the EU level a right to a fair trial. Article 47 of the CFR must be interpreted by the EU Courts in accordance with
Article 6-ECtHR's jurisprudence. 20 Such interpretation is indispensable for the EU law to provide continuously "equivalent" protection of fundamental rights to that of the ECHR system. 21 For these reasons the standards derived from Article 6 of the ECHR are bounding not only in case of enforcement of competition by the EU Member States (ECHR contracting parties) but also in case of central competition proceeding before the EU Commission and the EU Courts. 22 In the near future the entities unsatisfied with the fairness of EU competition proceedings will have a right to file a complaint against the EU to the ECHR. This will be one of consequences of the EU accession to the ECHR-the enforcement of the EU law by the EU institutions (in this case the Commission and the EU courts) will fall under the direct scrutiny of the ECtHR. 23 It is a right moment to ask whether the future applicants may succeed with complaints about insufficiency of judicial review exercised by the EU Courts.
1.3.
The analysis provided in the paper is meant to answer the question whether deferential standard of review is permissible under the full jurisdiction principle prescribed in Article 6(1) of the ECHR. The first part of the paper provides analysis of the EU courts review in competition law field and asks whether this review is deferential. After giving a positive answer the article embarks on a detailed examination of the ECtHR jurisprudence. In the final 19 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 83 of 30.3.2010, p. 389. 20 According to Article 52(3) of the CFR the fundamental rights there provided must have the same meaning and scope as the same rights laid down in the ECHR. The CJEU held that Article 47 of the CFR secures in EU law the protection afforded by Article 6(1) of the ECHR (Case C-386/10 P Chalkor part it provides the answer whether the EU courts deferential standard of review is permissible in the light of Article 6 of the ECHR and suggest improvements in the fairness of administrative process before the Commission. Review provided in Article 263 of the TFEU is described as "review of legality" 27 or "annulment jurisdiction" 28 . Where the EU courts find the decision of the Commission to be illegal (in violation of Article 263(2) of the TFEU) they may only annul it and remand to the The GC is precluded from substituting its own assessment of complex economic facts for that of the Commission. 54 Alrosa case predating the KME/Chalkor seems to provide still a valid proof for that. 55 In this case the GC when reviewing the Commission decision expressed according to the CJEU its "own differing assessment of the capability of the joint 49 Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P In these three cases the GC overturned the Commission's decision because the analysis of the effects of a proposed mergers were insufficient. 52 In Airtours (supra note 51, at paragraph 294) the Court concluded that the Commission's decision "far from basing its prospective analysis on cogent evidence, is vitiated by a series of errors of assessment as to factors fundamental to any assessment of whether a collective dominant position might be created. It follows that the Commission prohibited the transaction without having proved to the requisite legal standard that the concentration would give rise to a collective dominant position of the three major tour operators, of such a kind as significantly to impede effective competition in the relevant market". 53 Gerard, supra note 28, at 465. commitments to eliminate the competition problems identified by the Commission, before concluding (…) that alternative solutions that were less onerous for the undertakings than a complete ban on dealings existed in the present case". 56 The Court concluded that "(b)y so doing, the GC put forward its own assessment of complex economic circumstances and thus substituted its own assessment for that of the Commission, thereby encroaching on the discretion enjoyed by the Commission instead of reviewing the lawfulness of its assessment". 57 Importance of Alrosa ruling was noticed in EFTA Court Posten Norge judgment, where the Court after holding that "the submission that the Court may intervene only if it considers a complex economic assessment to be manifestly wrong must be rejected" 58 noted that the competition authority is precluded from substituting its own more preferable view for this of the authority if it finds the authority conclusion to be supported by evidence 59 .
Judicial review in EU
The EU courts jurisprudence shows also that the EU Courts may be deferential also in areas falling out of scope of complex economic and technical assessment. It is observed that in case
Archer Daniels Midland the EU Courts found the Commission to be better placed to carry out the task of the evaluation of evidence concerning the leader role of Archer Daniels Midland in the cartel. 60 Also appraisal of facts (different to establishment of facts itself) may also be review under more deferential "manifest error of appraisal" standard. 61 It is observed that EU courts apply a deferential standard in case of some of evidentiary issues "probably because of the implied belief that the evaluation of evidence is better carried out by the first instance decision-maker rather than by a court of review".
62 Surprisingly, the Commission is also accorded judicial deference to its fining policy. This happens despite the EU court unlimited jurisdictions in the field of fines. 63 The GC underlines that fines "constitute an instrument of the Commission's competition policy" and so "it must be allowed a margin of discretion when fixing their amount, in order that it may channel the conduct of undertakings towards observance of the competition rules". 64 The Commission has a margin of appreciation when fixing fines and "a particularly wide discretion as regards the choice of factors to be taken into account for the purposes of determining the amount of fines, such as, inter alia, the particular circumstances of the case, its context and the dissuasive effect of fines, without the need to refer to a binding or exhaustive list of the criteria which must be taken into account". 65 Crucially the Commission is granted deference as to the decision about the level of fines necessary to achieve the objective of the EU Treaties. On the other hand many agree "that the GC has exercised its limited powers of scrutiny in a remarkably effective way since its institution, as its case law in many landmark competition and merger cases demonstrates" and "it is undeniable that the Court has, by means of its review of individual decisions managed to hold the Commission to rather strict standards of proof and sound reasoning". 80 It is observed that "the margin of appreciation doctrine has not prevented the GC from looking into any economic or technical detail of a case that appeared remotely promising as a basis for a successful ground of appeal". 81 The EU Courts themselves strongly defend the compatibility of the current model of judicial review in the EU with the requirements of Article 6 of the ECHR.
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Against this background this part analyzes the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in order to give an answer whether from the Article 6 of the ECHR point of view this criticism is substantiated.
Potential conflict between the EU judicial practice and the ECHR requirements would mean that the changes as to the former are highly required. The constitutional role of Article 6 of the ECHR in the EU law underlies such thesis. Nonetheless, in such circumstances the Convention calls at least for one of the two following systems: either the jurisdictional organs themselves comply with the requirements of Article 6 para. 1, or they do not so comply but are subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of Article 6 para. 1", emphasis added) and paragraph 36 ("The public character of the cassation proceedings does not suffice to remedy the defect found to exist at the stage of the disciplinary proceedings. The Court of Cassation does not take cognisance of the merits of the case, which means that many aspects of "contestations" (disputes) concerning "civil rights and obligations", including review of the facts and assessment of the proportionality between the fault and the sanction, fall outside its jurisdiction"). Inspector came to conclusion that the local council was right to be concerned that the buildings had the appearance of large detached houses. Thus the Inspector rejected the appeal in all significant parts and held that any reasonable person would have concluded that he or she was looking at the start of a small new detached housing estate. The Inspector while taking the decision exercised his discretion on policy matters involving development in a green belt and conservation area. The applicant appealed against the Inspector's decision to High Court. The Court dismissed the appeal finding that no errors in law was committed. The appeal included also a challenge to the inspector's findings of fact, but this ground was not pursued at the hearing in the High Court. The applicant complained to the ECtHR that the High Court had no power to disturb the findings of fact made by the inspector "unless there was a defect which was so great as to go to jurisdiction".
The ECtHR observed (1) that the appeal to the High Court, being on "points of law", was not capable of embracing all aspects of the inspector's decision concerning the enforcement notice served on Mr Bryan; (2) that there was no rehearing of the original complaints submitted to the inspector; (3) that the High Court could not substitute its own decision on the merits for that of the inspector; (4) and that its jurisdiction over the facts was limited.
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Despite that the ECtHR was satisfied with the judicial review provided by the High Court. It observed that apart from the classic grounds of unlawfulness under English law (going to such issues as fairness, procedural propriety, independence and impartiality), the inspector's decision could have been quashed by the High Court if it had been made by reference to irrelevant factors or without regard to relevant factors; or if the evidence relied on by the inspector was not capable of supporting a finding of fact; or if the decision was based on an inference from facts which was perverse or irrational in the sense that no inspector properly directing himself would have drawn such an inference. 89 Speaking about the assessment of sufficiency of the review to the ECtHR noted in a more general manner that "it is necessary to have regard to matters such as the subject-matter of the decision appealed against, the manner in which that decision was arrived at, and the content of the dispute, including the desired and 88 Bryan, supra note 84, at paragraph 44. 89 Id.
actual grounds of appeal." 90 Also according to ECtHR the respect should be given by the court to decisions taken by administrative authorities on grounds of "expediency". 91 The required intensity of review depends in the light of Bryan standard on the presence of procedural safeguards during administrative phase of the proceedings and institutional guarantees of independence and impartiality of the administrative decisionmaker. 92 It seems that the greater is the level of procedural guarantees and the more quasi-judicial the proceedings are the more limited scope of judicial review may be. In any case procedural shortcomings alleged by the party should be subject to review by the court. 93 The ECtHR does not expect de novo review of evidence by the court. 94 It is sufficient if the reviewing court has a power to assess whether "the findings of fact or the inferences based on them were neither perverse nor irrational". 95 However, it seems that such deferential standard will be applicable only in case of review of factual findings that concern "policy matters" 96 in "the specialized area of law" and where the subject-matter of the contested administrative decision is an example of "exercise of discretionary judgment in the regulation of citizens' conduct".
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If these elements are lacking and the procedural guarantees during administrative phase are limited the ECtHR requires a more thorough review of administrative factual findings. In Tsfayo (2006), the case concerning the administration's refusal to pay backdated housing benefits to Ethiopian national living in UK, the ECtHR observed that in Bryan "the issues to be determined required a measure of professional knowledge or experience and the exercise of administrative discretion pursuant to wider policy aims". In contrast in Tsfayo "no 90 Id., at paragraph 45. 91 Id., at paragraph 47. 92 Id., at paragraph 46 ("In this connection the Court would once more refer to the uncontested safeguards attending the procedure before the inspector: the quasi-judicial character of the decision-making process; the duty incumbent on each inspector to exercise independent judgment; the requirement that inspectors must not be subject to any improper influence; the stated mission of the Inspectorate to uphold the principles of openness, fairness and impartiality"). 93 Id., at paragraph 46. 94 Id., at paragraph 47 ("while the High Court could not have substituted its own findings of fact for those of the inspector, it would have had the power to satisfy itself that the inspector's findings of fact or the inferences based on them were neither perverse nor irrational"). However in Bryan there was no dispute as to the primary facts before the High Court (Id.) 95 Id., at paragraph 47. See also the ECtHR judgment of 18 January 2001 in case Jane Smith v UK, no. 25154/94, paragraph 133. 96 Id., at paragraph 47 ("These submissions, as the Commission noted, went essentially to questions involving "a panoply of policy matters such as development plans, and the fact that the property was situated in a green belt and a conservation area"). 97 Id., at paragraph 47 ("Such an approach by an appeal tribunal on questions of fact can reasonably be expected in specialised areas of the law such as the one at issue, particularly where the facts have already been established in the course of a quasi-judicial procedure governed by many of the safeguards required by Article 6 para. 1. It is also frequently a feature in the systems of judicial control of administrative decisions found throughout the Council of Europe member States. Indeed, in the instant case, the subject-matter of the contested decision by the inspector was a typical example of the exercise of discretionary judgment in the regulation of citizens' conduct in the sphere of town and country planning. ", emphasis added).
specialist expertise was required to determine pure factual issue at stake" (the question whether there was "good cause" for the applicant's delay in making a claim). 98 Nor unlike in
Bryan the factual findings could have been said "to be merely incidental to the reaching of broader judgments of policy or expediency which it was for the democratically accountable authority to take". 99 Additionally, the administrative authority that decided the case was not impartial (it was directly connected to one of the parties to the dispute) and the procedural safeguards were not adequate to overcome this. 100 For these reasons the ECtHR found the judicial review that similarly like in Bryan was limited to the question whether the evidence supports the factual findings and whether the relevant factors were established not to be sufficient in the instant case. 101 The ECtHR found that there was never the possibility that the central issue would be determined by a tribunal that was independent of one of the parties to the dispute. 103 The ECtHR used also the instant case to summarize the applicable test by stating that "(i)n assessing the sufficiency of a judicial review available to an applicant, the Court will have regard to the powers of the judicial body in question and to such factors as (a) the subject-matter of the decision appealed against, in particular, whether or not it concerned a specialised issue requiring professional knowledge or experience and 102 Id. 103 The review was found to be sufficient despite the fact that the Supreme Court could not substitute its own decision for that of the national broadcasting authority and its jurisdiction over the facts was limited. The ECtHR was satisfied with the Supreme Court annulment jurisdiction based on a number of grounds, including the situation where the decision had been reached on the basis of a misconception of fact or law, there had been no proper enquiry or a lack of due reasoning, or on procedural grounds. The ECtHR observed that the subject matter of the administrative decision in question was a classic exercise of administrative discretion in the specialised area of law and that a number of procedural guarantees were available to the applicant in the administrative proceedings and that the applicant's allegations as to shortcomings in this proceedings, including those concerning objective partiality and the breach of the principles of natural justice, were subject to review by the Supreme Court. . A "tribunal" is characterised in ECtHR's jurisprudence in the substantive sense of the term by its judicial function, that is to say determining matters within its competence on the basis of rules of law and after proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner; it must also satisfy a series of further requirements -independence, in particular of the executive; impartiality; duration of its members' terms of office; guarantees afforded by its procedure -several of which appear in the text of Article 6(1) itself (see the judgment of 29 April 1988 in case Belilos v Switzerland, no. 10328/83, paragraph 64). 115 See also other cases, supra note 108.
In Sigma the ECtHR the Court did not find necessary to determine whether the criminal limb of Article 6(1) of the ECHR was applicable in that case. It stated only that paragraph 1 of Article 6, violation of which was alleged by the applicant, applies in civil matters as well as in the criminal sphere. 116 By doing so the ECtHR lost a chance to explain whether in practical terms there is any difference as to the required scope of procedural safeguards under Article 6(1) of the ECHR 117 between cases classified as civil and those criminal cases that in Jussila words fall out of the scope of hard core of criminal law. Some scholars indirectly suggest that
Sigma test determining the notion of sufficiency of judicial review could find application in the criminal in a sense of Article 6 of the ECHR EU competition law cases. 118 However, the ECtHR jurisprudence does not confirm this. 119 Rather when discussing the required scope of judicial review of administrative decisions imposing fines ("non-hard core" criminal cases)
the ECtHR uses slightly different language and never relies on Bryan, Tsfayo, Sigma and its other "civil" cases.
In two cases against Austria decided in 1995: Umlauft and Schmautzer the ECtHR described what "full jurisdiction" means in cases concerning criminal charge in a sense or Article 6 of the ECHR where the first instance adjudicative body does not meet the requirement of Article 6 of the ECHR. Both cases involved the fines imposed for violation of road law. The ECtHR defined laconically characteristics of a "judicial body that has full jurisdiction". Such body 116 Sigma, supra note 103, at paragraph 126; compare also Albert and Le Compte, supra note 84, paragraph 30 ("the Court does not believe that the two aspects, civil and criminal, of Article 6 para. 1 are necessarily mutually exclusive") and more recently in Volkov, supra note 108, at paragraph 92. The applicant in Sigma argued, that the fines imposed by national broadcasting authority were in fact of a criminal nature and that therefore the complaint could also be examined under the criminal head of the Article 6 § 1 and relied on the findings of the ECtHR in Jussila. The ECtHR denied dealing with the sufficiency of review of fines by the Cyprus Supreme Court because these issues were not raised by the applicant before that court in the legal points on which its recourses were based (Sigma, supra note 103, at 167). The ECtHR was also persuaded by the Government position that a number of Supreme Court judgments in judicial review proceedings indicate that the Supreme Court has the competence to examine the necessity and proportionality of the fines in its judicial review role (Sigma, supra note 103, at 168). 117 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 6 of the ECHR may find application only in criminal cases (compare the wording of these provisions). 118 Nazzini, supra note 43, at 989 ("The distinction between the determination of a "criminal charge" and the determination of "civil rights and obligations" is relevant but only as a contextual element of the functionalist analysis that specifies the intensity of the protection in each individual case. There is no obstacle in principle, therefore, to extending the jurisprudence of the Court in cases concerning civil rights and obligations to the determination of criminal charges, particularly in the light of the overbroad definition of "criminal charge" under Article 6(1)"). For a different opinion see Editorial Comments, supra note 43, at 1411. Nicholas Khan and Wouter Wils also refer to Sigma in the analysis of judicial review of EU Commission decisions; see Nicholas Khan, supra note 29, at 564 and Wouter Wils, supra note 32, at 8. See also Andreas Scordamaglia-Tousis, supra note 32, at 149. 119 In the judgment of 17 April 2012 in case Steininger v Austria, no. 21539/07 the ECtHR after discussing the standards of assessing sufficiency in civil cases stemming from Bryan noted that "(i)n the present case, however, the criminal head of Article 6 § 1 applies to the proceedings at issue and in its case-law the Court followed a different approach as regards the scope of review of criminal sanctions imposed by administrative authorities" (paragraph 52).
should have a power to quash in all respects, on questions of fact and law, the decision of the body below 120 as well as examine all the relevant facts. 121 This standard was invoked and further developed in 2002 in Janosevic, the case concerning the imposition of tax surcharges qualified as criminal sanctions within the autonomous meaning of Article 6(1). 122 The ECtHR did not make any reference to Bryan standard even if at this time it was invoking this standard in administrative cases concerning civil rights or obligations in a sense of Article 6 of ECHR. Instead, the ECtHR found that the system where tax authorities are entitled to impose sanctions like tax surcharges is not incompatible with Article 6(1) so long as the taxpayer can bring any such decision affecting him before a judicial body that has full jurisdiction, including (in Umlauft words) the power to quash in all respects, on questions of fact and law, the challenged decision. 123 The ECtHR found that the Swedish administrative court had jurisdiction to examine all aspects of the matters before them and was not restricted to points of law but could also extend to factual issues, including the assessment of evidence. 124 If it disagreed with the findings of the Tax Authority, they had the power to quash the decisions appealed against. 125 Insufficient review was instead found to be provided in Steininger (2012). The ECtHR after consciously rejecting the possibility of relying on Bryan standard 126 on the basis of Umlauft/Schmautzer and Janosevic found that Austrian administrative court's decision merely related to questions of law by simply referring to a previous decision on a similar matter and contained no answer to the applicant company's complaint relating to the facts. 127 For this reason such review could not be qualified "as adequate 'full review' of the applicant company's criminal conviction passed by an administrative authority". 128 interested party. 145 It could exempt the taxpayer from the disputed taxes and penalties or modify the amount thereof within the limits prescribed by law, and where penalties were concerned, it could lower the rate within the limits of the applicable legal provisions. 146 The applicant could also discuss before the court the base used to calculate the tax in order to persuade the administrative court to reduce it. 147 However, interestingly for competition law context, the ECtHR accepted the system where the fiscal fine is expressed as a percentage of the unpaid tax. 148 In the opinion of the ECtHR such a system is needed for fiscal measures to be sufficiently effective to preserve the interests of the State. 149 It is also permissible on the grounds that "such cases differ from the hard core of criminal law for the purposes of the Convention". 145 Id. 146 Id. 147 Id., at paragraph 57. 148 The applicant was complaining that in such a system the administrative courts did not have the power to vary the fiscal fine in the absence of any legal provision to that effect (id. at paragraph 58) The ECtHR answered "that the law itself, to a certain degree, makes the fine proportionate to the seriousness of the taxpayer's conduct, by expressing it as a percentage of the unpaid tax, the calculation of which the applicant company had ample opportunity to discuss in this case" (id. at paragraph 59). 149 Id., at paragraph 59. 150 Id.
Umlauft/Schmautzer standard (and not on Bryan) was also invoked by the ECtHR in 2004 in
151 Grande Stevens, supra note 113, at 149. In Sigma (case decided under Article 6 civil head) the ECtHR was not assessing the compatibility of the review of fines with the requirements of Article 6 ECHR. However, it was content to observe that the Cyprus Supreme Court has the competence to examine the necessity and proportionality of the fines (Sigma, supra note 103, at 168).
criminal (such as cases dealt with in EU Article 101-102 TFEU infringement proceedings)
even if inspiring for a discussion may not always bring fully precise conclusions.
4.2.
In administrative proceedings concerning civil rights or obligations deferential standard of review is permissible in particular if (1) subject matter of the decision involves a specialized issue requiring professional knowledge or experience and the exercise of administrative discretion or concern policy matters in the specialized area of law; (2) administrative proceedings offer many of Article 6 safeguards and the decision is delivered by the authority that is impartial and independent. The more of these elements are present (for example the more quasi-judicial the process before the administrative authority is) the more likely it is that the ECtHR will be satisfied with the limited standard of review. The ECtHR might even accept the review where the courts check only whether the administrative authority's factual finding or the inferences based on them were neither perverse nor irrational. In any case, however, the court must is empowered to determine the central issue in dispute and have a power to remand the case to the administrative authority. Thus we may conclude that there is a floor for deference when it comes to administrative cases influencing individual's civil rights or obligation. From the ECHR perspective judicial review in case of competition authorities' mergers or commitment decisions can be more limited than in case of competition authorities decisions that impose fines for a violation of the prohibition of practices restricting competition.
4.3.
In administrative cases classified as criminal (Article 101-102 infringement proceedings concern such cases) the ECtHR never directly suggested that limitations in the standard of review may be justified in the view of subject matter of the decision (professional knowledge or exercise of administrative discretion) or because of specialized area of law being involved.
Instead, the ECtHR on many occasions held that the decision of an administrative authority that does not fulfill itself the conditions of Article 6 of the ECHR must be subject to subsequent control by a court that has full jurisdiction: a court that has a power to quash in all respects, in fact or in law, decision rendered by the administrative authority. Such court must in particular have jurisdiction to address all issues of fact and law relevant to the case before it as well as actually assess not only legal issues but also factual ones. Additionally full review of penalty is required including the court power to assess its proportionality and power to modify its amount (within the limits prescribed by law) or to annul it.
In practice however, the ECtHR accepts quite limited standard of review of administrative decisions in criminal cases. It does not expect full rehearing of the evidence and does not require that the courts to have a power to substitute its own view for this of the administrative authority. It rather takes case by case approach and sees its task mainly as a control over the sufficiency of the judicial review in the case under complaint. Thus in some instances (for example in Menarini) it accepts a review that is formally limited to legal questions if in fact it goes further so as the evidentiary issues are also reviewed.
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It is doubtful whether in criminal cases the ECtHR will start using directly the Bryan/Tsfayo test so as to agree for the limitations of judicial review on the basis on the subject-matter of the decision appealed against. However, it is not impossible to reject a possibility that such factors will indirectly play a role in ECtHR's acceptance of a more lenient standard of review in particular criminal case under complaint. 153 On the other hand it is well-justified to claim that quite limited standard of review in criminal cases will be seen by the ECtHR to be in accordance with Article 6 of the ECHR if many of Article 6 safeguards will be present during the administrative phase of the proceedings. In Menarini the fact that Italian competition authority was considered by the ECtHR to be independent might have played a role in the 156 Id., at paragraphs 122-123. In Grande Stevens lack of access to oral hearing during administrative phase of proceedings or during the proceedings before the court the exercised full jurisdiction over the administrative proceedings combined with the lack of objective impartiality during the administrative proceedings led the ECtHR to the conclusion that Article 6 of the ECHR was violated in this case. 157 The only example of such situation is the line of ECtHR's judgments in Austrian cases invoked above in which the ECtHR found that very limited review of Austrian administrative courts does not past Article 6 test.
and consistent and whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.
Lack of such close look would still be found by the ECtHR to be permissible in case of commitment proceedings as it is possible for the Commission to invoke Bryan/Sigma standard and claim that subject matter of the commitment decision involves a specialized issue requiring professional knowledge or experience and the exercise of administrative discretion.
Thus even very deferential approach presented by the CJEU in Alrosa could possibly pass the test of Article 6 of the ECHR on condition that the ECtHR concluded that sufficient procedural safeguards had been provided during the administrative proceedings before the Commission and that still the EU Courts had reviewed a central issue of the case. . 159 The General Court pretty often reduces the fine imposed by the Commission in cartel cases especially in consequence of the Commission's wrongful assessment of the duration of the cartel, see the data provided by Andreas Scordamaglia-Tousis, supra note 32, at 431-446. 160 Chalkor, supra note 50, at paragraph 62 ("the Courts cannot use the Commission's margin of discretioneither as regards the choice of factors taken into account in the application of the criteria mentioned in the Guidelines or as regards the assessment of those factors -as a basis for dispensing with the conduct of an indepth review of the law and of the facts"); see also Schindler, supra note 82, at paragraph 38. Compare Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, supra note 40, at 532. 161 Siemens Österreich, supra note 74, at paragraph 221.
instant case the information provided did not in fact added any significant value. 162 Such review would most probably satisfy the ECtHR. In the very end the defense of the EU judicial review before the ECtHR could rely on Segame and claim that certain limitation in judicial review of fines in the competition law field falling out the scope of hard core of criminal law is needed for the competition law system to be effective. 163 4.5. As U.S. experience proves some deference left to administrative authorities may enable them to conduct the enforcement policy that answers to new market developments and changing economic conditions that might influence free market economy. 164 On the other hand very aggressive judicial review of competition agency's decisions may in certain instances put at risk correct enforcement priorities in the field of competition law. 165 There is a need for such construction of judicial review that both safeguards parties' rights to fair trial and takes into account arguments in favor of deference. The ECHR standards of judicial review seem to answer correctly to such needs. The ECtHR does not require de novo rehearing of evidence before the court and in many occasions accepts quite limited review of administrative authorities' decisions.
The ECtHR acceptance of limited review depends on whether procedural safeguards are provided during the administrative phase of proceedings. There is a place for improvement in this respect when it comes to the proceedings before the Commission. Especially greater division of prosecutorial and adjudicative function is needed so as the objective impartiality is guaranteed. 166 In Menarini-the case used very often in defense of the correctness of the model of the proceedings before the Commission-the ECtHR was not dealing with the question of impartiality of Italian competition authority. 167 The focus was on the sufficiency of judicial review. Instead, in subsequent Grande Stevens the ECtHR found that the guarantees of impartiality in the proceedings before Italian Companies and Stock Exchange
Commission were insufficient 168 what combined with lack of access to public, oral hearing both before the administrative authority and the reviewing court brought the ECtHR to the conclusion that Article 6 of the ECHR was violated. 169 Taking into account this judgment one could recommend further improvements of decision-making process in the proceedings before the Commission. 170 The reading of Grande Stevens may suggest that the lack of objective impartiality combined with lack of direct access to the decision-maker at oral hearing 171 and other, further limitation of right to fair trial in the case under complaint (for instance lack of possibility to cross-examine the Commission's witness 172 ) could bring the ECtHR to conclusion that the EU violated Article 6 of the ECHR even if the judicial review exercised by the EU courts was found by the ECtHR to be sufficient. Even if likelihood that ECtHR finds a violation of ECHR in the future is limited the EU should consider undertaking reforms that would further minimize such risk. Potential clash with ECHR system even in a single case could undermine the legitimacy of competition law enforcement system in the EU as a whole and so diminish its effectiveness with adverse effects for consumers.
Conclusion
Analysis of the ECtHR jurisprudence leads to conclusion that current practice of reviewing of 
